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Why Women Are Representing Men in a Japanese Town Assembly:

A Little Tale About Gender Politics[1]

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Abstract

Research on gender and politics often focuses on the way in which social expectations about gender roles constrain the expansion of women's political participation; however, gender expectations constrain men's political behavior as well. Through a case study of men's and women's participation in local assembly elections in a rural Japanese town, this article offers a preliminary analysis of the way in which expectations about masculinity limit the types of men who can participate directly in political life. Men's obligations as family breadwinners worked to keep male members of a citizens' movement from standing for office while they put up wives and daughters as candidates instead. The "breadwinner" notion of masculinity is seldom critically examined by the men who fill breadwinner roles, despite the fact that the notion controls men's claims on the political arena. Quality-of-life challenges to status quo politics are especially difficult for middle-class salaried, male workers to make. Simple, dualistic notions of men as more politically powerful than women are not effective for tracing the actual dimensions of political power.

Key words: gender and politics, masculinity, salaryman, Japanese local politics

In the last decade, Japanese female politicians have received enormous attention for their growing presence in local politics and for their demands that politics focus on issues neglected by the postwar conservative regime. The voices of these new women politicians are often summed up in the Japanese as the "*kurashi*"(暮らし)or "*seikatsu*"(生活)(daily life) perspective. Making creative use of the widely accepted stereotype that women are closer to the home than men, these women emphasize the importance of an "ordinary citizen's" voice in politics, focus on "quality-of-life" or "care" issues, and pursue constituency mobilization strategies that downplay organizational hierarchy and professionalism in favor of what is often called the "handmade" election. In my own work, I have called this sort of politics "bicycle citizenship" to contrast it with the largely male world of established political parties with their institutionalized hierarchies and considerable resources (which I have called "taxi politics") (LeBlanc 1999a). In this article, I turn from women's gendered use of quality-of-life rhetoric to examine, instead, the ways in which gender role expectations operate on men who want to levy similar "daily life" claims against the political system.

I am frequently asked if non-elite men—such as the husbands of housewife activists—can also be thought of as bicycle citizens, too. In other words, can non-elite men use their outsider status as a symbolic ground from which to resist the political status quo and to demand a new politics with greater emphasis on broad participation, ethical clarity, flexibility, and sensitivity to the needs of the weakest members of society? Female politicians who use the bicycle citizenship strategy of relying on the cultural presumption of their special connection with ordinary home life are often handicapped by their lack of access to the organizational and financial resources that the elites in the male-dominant political and economic establishment possess; the housewife image is not the most effective social transportation to the center of Japan's political system. However, just as there are places—in the midst of traffic jams and down narrow streets, for example—where bicycles are a more effective form of transportation than cars,

the home-centered, female politicians I call bicycle citizens can do some sorts of political work more effectively than the elite men of taxi politics(LeBlanc 1999a). Can non-elite men share this "bicycle" advantage? No.

Like bicycle citizen women, non-elite men are excluded from the centers of political power in a variety of ways; however, the source of men's political exclusion differs from that experienced by women. The limit of a non-elite man's political participation is often powerfully influenced by gender expectations about men's work outside the home as household breadwinners. Determination to meet these expectations constrains non-elite men's capacity to voice complaints about the terms of their exclusion from politics. In fact, when political involvement threatens their breadwinner capacity, men may be at least as constrained by the culture of gender role expectations as women are, and Japanese men can not draw on their sex as a shortcut symbol of their challenge to status quo politics in the way that women can claim to represent the viewpoint of daily life simply by being women. It is easy to see how gender expectations contribute to women's exclusion from politics; as comparatively hard as it is to see, the same is true for men. Japan's political system is male dominated, but *most* Japanese men, unable to play either the taxi politician or the bicycle citizen role, are not likely to play a part in it.

Political scientists have documented how widely accepted notions of womanhood affect or are affected by women's participation in politics without thinking about the ways in which gender conditions men's participation as well (LeBlanc 1999b). The story of how Japanese female politicians are using their experiences as housewives and mothers to justify themselves as spokespersons for ordinary citizens on issues such as care for the aged, consumer and environmental protection, and freedom of information deserves attention because the policy questions on which women's voices have been effective are important ones and because the growing involvement of women in the political process demonstrates a significant change in gender role expectations for women (See

for examples: 青木 1985, 1991; Iwao 1993; 国広 1993; LeBlanc 1999a; 御巫 1999; Maclachlan 2002). However, as paradoxical as it may sound, the focus on the rise of women's "caring politics" as an achievement of *female* politicians obscures the fact that even where women are gaining a new political voice, men's voices remain curiously controlled.(2) The growing field of men's studies has done much to uncover the ways in which gender expectations constrain men's life choices, sometimes to the extent that men must fight employers and social norms in order to fully participate in some aspects of life to which men would seem to have a natural right, such as fatherhood (See for examples: 伊藤 1993, 1996; 西川，荻野 1999; 多賀 2001; 天野 2001; and Roberson and Suzuki 2003). Nonetheless, we make little effort to examine how men's actions in politics are shaped by notions of masculinity.(3)

Our silence on the connection between masculinity and politics means we ignore the ways in which men in politics are constrained by their gender; by association we imply that a politics that does not include women is not lacking in anything other than female bodies, that women's use of the politics of "bicycle citizenship" is simply their attempt to substitute for a more whole politics they could practice freely if they were men. But is that true? In a case study of one town's challenge to postwar conservative hegemony, I attempt to highlight the ways in which the gendered notion of men as breadwinners works to keep men from practicing the politics of bicycle citizenship even when that is precisely what they wish to do. If men, because they are men, find it difficult to practice certain sorts of important politics, then a political world in which few women participate is gravely distorted—not only because women's voices are missing but also because gender expectations repress men's abilities to speak for the full diversity of political needs *men* have. In examining the constraints gender places on men in one case, I also hope to provoke a larger reexamination of the marginal status we have given to the study of gender in political life.

Women's Bicycle Citizenship Challenge to the Postwar Establishment

In order to understand the sort of politics from which men's voices have often been excluded, we need to know something about the role some women have come play in the Japanese political system. As "bicycle citizens," women have made their way into politics in precisely the places where cynicism about the policies and practices of postwar leaders has been at its highest. Since the late 1970s, increasing numbers of women have entered formal political arenas. In population-dense prefectures such as Tokyo, Saitama, and Kanagawa, where voters have long been underrepresented at the national level, women have occupied more than 10 per cent of local assembly seats for the past couple of election cycles (『朝日新聞』99. 4.27 ; 国広 1995). Following the 1999 local elections in Saitama, women took 14.2 per cent of all "city" (as opposed to village, town, or prefectural) seats (『朝日新聞』99. 4.27). In Osaka, as well, women's move into politics is attracting attention (『新潟日報』99.4.26). These trends have continued in the most recent elections. Women's capture of 50 per cent of the seats in the town assembly of Oiso, Kanagawa prefecture made the news in June 2003 (蔵前 2003).

Women's presence in disaffected urban areas is not the only significant aspect of women's growing participation in politics. Just as the growing numbers of female politicians attract attention, so does their tendency to justify their claims to power on the basis of their capacity to make quality-of-life concerns central to public life. Where quality-of-life challenges to conservative dominance spring up, so does the political participation of women. Most of the Oiso female politicians got their start in an environmental protection citizen's movement (蔵前 2003). Following the 1999 scandal over dioxin-contaminated spinach caused by trash incineration in Tokorozawa city, Saitama prefecture, 10 women were elected to the 36-member Tokorozawa assembly(『朝日新聞』99. 4.27), three more than the previous historic record of seven. Of course, scattered episodes such as the rise of women in the Tokorozawa assembly during a local environmental crisis

or the rise of women in politics, even to the status of mayor, in Zushi city during a dispute over the disposition of forest land there（青木 1985), can not prove quality-of-life challenges are avenues for increasing women's participation in formal political arenas. But the coincidences are more than a little provocative.

In each election cycle, reports from around the country document the slow but steady advance into formal political arenas of women bearing a bicycle citizen's message. In the case study I will examine below, women have become the standard bearers in elected office for a challenge to conservative hegemony in Machi,[4] a rural town on the Japanese coast. In fact, although prior to 1995 only a single woman had ever served in the 22-member Machi town assembly, in 2004, 7 women hold seats, and Machi has become a leading example in its prefecture and, indeed, the nation, of women's advancement into formal political power. As groups of primarily male local activists in Machi tried to stop the building of an industrial waste disposal plant, they suddenly found themselves relying on the electoral muscle of women—in some cases their wives and daughters—who brought into politics not only opposition to the waste plant favored by the town's conservative leaders but also the "care" agendas and anti-organization constituency networks that distinguish bicycle citizenship.

As recent changes in Machi illustrate, some sorts of challenges to the establishment are easier for women to carry out than they are for men. Notions of masculine power provide men with some political benefits, but the breadwinner expectations that come with masculine power are also disabilities for men. To put it more baldly, Japanese men who want to mount a "quality-of-life" or "ordinary citizens'" challenge to the underpinnings of the postwar policy consensus and political power structure are often dependent upon women to do it for them. Below I discuss the case of women's rise in Machi politics in more detail, describing the method of my research there and examining how gender expectations for men closed the door on some types of political engagement by male activists.

My Case Study Method

The case of women's entry into Machi politics that I discuss below is part of a larger study of men's and women's engagements with local assembly politics that I conducted between January and August of 1999, with follow-up work between September and December of 2002. I chose the spring and early summer of 1999 to conduct the field portion of my research because Unified Local Elections were held in April 1999. I spent seven months in the field, dividing my time between Tokyo and Machi. In each site, the bulk of my research work was participant observation. I attached myself to a small number of candidates and followed their progress through the pre-campaign, campaign, and post-campaign periods by doing such things as attending meetings of their support groups, stuffing envelopes or painting signs while observing behavior in campaign offices on a daily basis, and interviewing candidates and their supporters.

In Tokyo, I affiliated myself with the campaign of a Liberal Democratic Party male in his mid thirties running for what had been his father's seat in a ward assembly. I also spent some time with an LDP female seeking reelection to the same ward assembly. In Machi, I actually rented a room in the home of a family that was central in organizing the Citizen's Referendum Association, the group that, beginning with an unofficial citizen's referendum it administered in 1995, led efforts to topple the conservative majority in the town assembly that was seeking to allow the building of an industrial waste plant. I followed the Referendum Association's efforts to find and run five candidates for office in the town assembly, as well as the efforts of affiliated waste plant opposition groups running their own candidates.

In both Tokyo and Machi, I also made efforts to interview candidates and activists whose experiences were not likely to be represented in the field sites where I conducted my participant observer research. In Machi, I was able to interview several of the pro-plant conservatives who won seats in the town assembly in 1999. These men—long-term politicos with ties to the hegemonic,

conservative Liberal Democratic Party—were the political opponents of the men on whom I focus in this article, the men who formed the citizens' referendum movement and eventually ended up running wives and daughters for local office. Most of these pro-plant conservatives were interviewed after the election had been concluded, when my well known connections to anti-plant factions could not cause electoral harm to conservative candidates. Finally, because Machi's politics were distinct from Tokyo's not only in being rural but also in being an important site of the referendum drive that swept around the country in the late 1990s, I also traveled to two other cities where citizens initiated successful referendum movements and spoke to leaders of those organizations. In this article, space constraints do not allow me to discuss the research I conducted outside of Machi; however, the work in Tokyo and elsewhere informs my interpretation of what I observed among male and female political activists in Machi.

My research method presents some limitations. Because I must rely in important ways on personal contacts and the qualities of my personality to build the rapport necessary to entry into a field site where I can conduct prolonged participant observation, my sample of the participants in Japanese political life is necessarily biased by who I am and who I know. The generalizations I make based upon the claims and behavior of my informants are necessarily problematic to the extent that my informants are a problematic sample of the population. I do make some generalizations nonetheless; but I must offer these more as working statements from which further investigation should proceed than as claims of social science law.

Just as my method limits me in some ways, it also provides me with opportunities for exploring the nature of the interactions between gender and political activism other sorts of methods are not as good at providing. Because gender regimes are effective to the extent that we accept as "only natural" what they tell us about appropriate behavior for men and women, informants may not be immediately self conscious about them. Of course, as women make unprecedented

gains in electoral competition, women and men become more thoughtful about the terms by which gender expectations for women are delineated. But men's ascendancy in politics is especially the sort of "gender regime in action" that Japanese and Americans are quick to assume is merely a reflection of "the way things are" rather than a phenomenon worthy of investigation. When I ask my male informants directly how being men affects their political behavior, they are taken aback by the question, much as I expect my female informants would be if I asked them how being women affects their behavior as mothers. Only through repeated conversations and observations in the same field can I begin to get a sense of how a system that is second nature to my informants operates to shape the unquestioned assumptions upon which they ground their thinking and behavior in politics. Some political scientists unfamiliar with ethnographic research done in other disciplines may also find my presentation style disconcerting. I write in the first person and present many of the circumstances in which I observed the operation of gendered notions of appropriate behavior on politics as if they are "dramas" in which I have been a participant. I choose this style for two reasons. First, it reminds both me and my readers that I am working from a single case study; that I do not have the luxury of "scientific" distance from my informants that a large, anonymous survey-based work would provide. Second, my style emphasizes for my readers what I believe my observations show to be true about gendered regimes of power: they are hard to see from the "objective" place of the outside observer because they work precisely by playing on the sense of what is required of one who wishes to continue to be accepted and honored as an insider by his peers.[5] These requirements are subtle and expressed in only the most indirect ways, even among friends. Strangers hardly discuss them. After all, wouldn't most members of contemporary society view as suspect the masculinity of a man who had to be constantly told what a man is? The strength of my research method and my style is that it provides precisely the sort of rich exposure to my informants necessary to see the unexamined structures of daily life in action.

Machi's New Gender Regime

In Machi in the mid 1990s, against the opposition of the mayor and the overwhelming majority of the town assembly members, citizens' groups began calling for an official citizens' referendum on whether an industrial waste plant should be built in their municipality. These pro-referendum citizens' groups banded together to elect representatives supportive of a referendum to the local assembly. The Referendum Association took an officially neutral position on the building of the plant but demanded an official town referendum be held and that the town's elected leaders abide by its results. The Referendum Association was also joined by the Green Association (fighting the plant primarily for environmental reasons), the local Social Democratic Party, and the local Communist Party. Other groups that had long led plant opposition provided support as well, but nearly all of their members had overlapping membership in one of the above groups. In 1995, the pro-referendum alliance succeeded in electing four new representatives to the local assembly and in building secondary alliances with several returned incumbents, including four conservatives who opposed the plant, as well as the Social Democrats and the Communists, which held one seat each. After a complicated series of events, including the threatened recall and eventual replacement of Machi's mayor, the referendum was held. Sixty-one per cent of voters in the referendum said "no" to the waste plant (turnout was approximately 89 per cent), but nothing in Japanese law makes a local referendum of this sort binding on the actions of local officials (For a cogent explanation see: 今井 462). Therefore, in 1999, these same citizens' groups once again ran candidates for the local assembly in an effort to make sure the city government abided by the referendum results.

In both the 1995 and 1999 elections in which the Referendum Association and its allied anti-plant citizens' groups ran candidates, they were most successful with female candidates, despite the fact that men played prominent roles in the leadership of these groups. In 1995, the referendum group and its citizen

movement allies, what I call here the "referendum alliance," ran six candidates for the twenty-two seat assembly, including two men and four women, and they elected three women and one man. (The term "referendum alliance" does not include the conservatives, Social Democrats, and Communists who also opposed the plant and ran only male candidates.)[6] In 1999, the referendum alliance ran a total of seven candidates; five candidates were elected. Referendum alliance members supported the candidacies of two men and five women. This time all five women were elected while the two men, including one who was an incumbent, failed to win seats. As a result, by the end of the election cycle in Machi in 1999, three citizens' groups in which men were the formal leaders, key decision makers, and the chief fundraisers found themselves dependent upon women for public representation, and Machi, a town formerly known for its corrupt, conservative (and masculine) politics, became a leader in its prefecture and the nation for the proportion of its elected offices held by women.

The remarkable shift in the representation of women in Machi's assembly was the result of a combination of factors, but two seemed decisive. First, the leaders of anti-plant and pro-referendum groups in Machi had difficulty finding viable male candidates to run for office despite earnest efforts to do so. Potential male candidates described the loyalties and duties that were incumbent upon them in their roles as economic providers for their families as precluding them from taking the risk to participate in politics as candidates for office. Therefore, male group leaders turned literally to wives and daughters to carry out an electoral challenge they had not initially intended to have any effect on the gender balance of town politics. Second, even when the group leaders did find men to field in the town assembly race, those men, because they were men, lacked some of the resources female candidates had for mobilization of constituencies not already mobilized by establishment conservatives. Men chose different campaign strategies, and their vote totals suggest those strategies were not as effective as the strategies women candidates chose. Of course, other factors, including indi-

vidual personality and reputation in the community were doubtless important in determining election outcomes, but the factors of candidate availability and campaign strategy seem to hold true for each of the referendum alliance candidates in Machi in 1999. Moreover, my own research elsewhere and anecdotal evidence from newspaper reports seem to confirm the general drift of my findings in Machi. Below, I will discuss each of the factors separately.

How Breadwinner Status Kept Men Out of Politics

In Machi in 1995 and 1999 and 2003, male referendum alliance activists who had no intention of challenging contemporary gender role expectations backed a history-making number of women's campaigns for local office because men could not get their male friends to run. The 40-something and 50-something men who dominated the referendum alliance were dominated in turn by their family breadwinner roles, and thus they experienced real limits on their capacities for political involvement, despite the fact that they shared an intense desire to bring a voice to politics they believed had been ignored by conservative men of older generations who had long dominated the mayor's office and local assembly.(7) Research by sociologists and historians documents the force of the family breadwinner expectations placed on Japanese men. Even men of the "bubble generation" who claim to believe that men and women should share equally in the home and in work outside the home, usually find themselves playing out a traditional breadwinner role, devoting themselves first to the needs of their employers, leaving the duties of home and community to their wives （山嵜 2001；伊藤1996, especially 288–293）. In fact, according to Amano Masako, "Until now, the number one condition of a man being a man has been his taking on the economic responsibilities of the family. In this way, to 'do something for oneself' and to 'do something for one's family' have been seen as largely the same thing" (天野 2001: 40). This means that, even when men have seen the gendered division of labor as problematic, most have chosen not to rebel against it （山嵜

1999: 106). When men choose not to fulfill a family's breadwinner role, they are often obliged to justify their claims to a masculine identity with the self-conscious construction of an alternative narrative that replaces the predominant image of dedicated salaryman (Roberson 1999; Gill 1999).

Alternative narratives might help men who have eschewed or failed at breadwinner roles find peace in private life. However, in Machi public life, commitment to the breadwinner role was a prerequisite of a man's participation because his family was usually dependent upon a man's earnings in paid employment and because a man's reputation as a good man, the sort of man one would want to elect for office, was dependent upon his reputation as a hardworking, uncomplaining breadwinner. The employment and reputation demands placed on men often knocked them out of contention as candidates, and thus referendum alliance members were forced to ask women to take their voice into politics.

Two of the women elected in 1995 and reelected in 1999 were the wives of men who had run unsuccessfully for mayor on anti-waste plant platforms. One of these two women, Aoki-san, was supported by the Referendum Association; her husband was a founding member of the Association who had run for Machi mayor in 1982 as a representative of the waste plant opposition movement. The other of these two women, Sakata-san, was a representative of the Green Association; her husband had represented the anti-plant interests in his unsuccessful bid for mayor in 1994. A third, Kagawa-san, also a winner in both elections, was the wife of a man very active in the Social Democratic Party and a longtime leader of the waste plant opposition movement. Kagawa-san ran as an independent, but her husband and his Socialist connections were leading staffers in her campaign. A fourth, Miura-san, was the daughter of one of the original group of "seven samurai" (as they were described locally and by journalists) who contributed financial support to the Referendum Association's self-administered, unofficial referendum. The fifth woman, Toda-san, a loser in the 1995 assembly elections but a winner in 1999, was the daughter of a deceased former

assemblyman. Originally he had been a conservative supporter of the power plant, but in later years he had decided the plant was a bad idea. His daughter was supported by the Referendum Association.

In 1995 and in 1999, the Referendum Association also ran two male candidates. In 1995, one of the two men, Takahashi-san, won a seat, and the losing male took on the role of leader of the Referendum Association. In 1999, Takahashi ran for reelection and was joined by Horiuchi-san, another male member of the Referendum Association; both men lost their bids for seats. Following the 1999 elections, Takahashi-san was offered the leadership of the Referendum Association, and Referendum Association leaders and the women elected to represent them in the assembly all remarked frequently and publicly on the fact that the group's interests were now in the hands of "three mere women." Of course, to the extent that the Referendum Association was dependent upon its allied groups, it was represented by five women and four men (two conservatives, a Socialist, and a Communist who were supportive of but not directly involved in the referendum movement and the related effort to implement its results).

The fact that women were so prominently placed is surprising given the history of extreme underrepresentation of women in the political institutions of Machi and the rest of Japan. But what is more surprising is that, unlike such groups as the Seikatsu-sha Netto that have had notable successes in electing women to office, the groups in Machi that pushed women to the fore of electoral politics were unabashedly male in their leadership. At the Referendum Association meetings, the discussion was managed by men and dominated by men's voices. Other sorts of work were also divided by gender. Women prepared and served refreshments at meetings and group events. However, men formulated strategy, designed flyers describing the group's principles, and did their best to assess campaign progress. Men formed the bulk of the group who discussed the names of potential candidates and approached the named individuals with requests that they run. Men were the contacts with the many journalists from around

the country seeking to understand the movement.

During my fieldwork, I stuck as close as possible to the male leaders in order to get the best inside view of the organization, and as the election date grew closer, the meetings I attended with them became more and more male. At the most sensitive ones discussing projected vote counts and the delicacies of the Referendum Association's alliance with other anti-plant groups, I was often the only woman. Perhaps there was no greater symbol of the men's preeminent position than the fact that they sat huddled around the kerosene heater in the center of the prefabricated building the group used as their headquarters. The women kept to the chillier outskirts of the room, not an enviable spot in a northern Japan winter. When I visited meetings of the Green Association and events at the campaign headquarters of independent Kagawa-san, men occupied center stage in similar ways. The Green Association did include women in strategy discussions, but these tended to be dominated by men who also happened to be academics and used their specialized skills of analyzing and presenting information to control the discussion. At the office opening party for Kagawa-san, women were so marginalized that most of them sat in a different room from the male representatives of supporting organizations and the Social Democratic party whose speeches were the main event.

Clearly the male leaders of the Referendum Association, Green Association, and independent-Socialist group had no intention of remaking the gender power structure of their town. The reason women ended up representing their organizations was that gender role expectations got in the way of men running for office. Even though many of the female members of these organizations worked at least parttime, the primary breadwinners in nearly all of the families with members involved in the anti-plant movement were men. And generally, movement members did not believe that holding an assembly seat was compatible with male members' roles as breadwinners. This belief may be surprising given that, prior to 1995, all but one assembly seat had always been held by men.

But as the leader of the Referendum Association and several others, male and female, put it to me, those assembly seats had long been viewed as "honorary positions" (*meiyo shoku* 名誉職) for men who were either retired or so far advanced in careers such as farming or running a small business that they had the time to devote to the weekday assembly meetings. According the town's official report for 1999, the previous year the assembly had met for 65 days out of the year, divided into four regular sessions and two special sessions which were only 4 days long. Since 45 of those days were devoted to committee work, it is likely not all days would have required the work of all assembly persons. The basic assembly person's salary was 246,000 yen per month. On meeting days, assembly members received an extra 1000 yen, and seasonal "bonuses" were also paid. The assembly speaker and committee chairs received a slightly higher basic salary. Given the amount of time off required on week days and the constraints of the salary, it is not hard to understand why men in their prime breadwinning years would find it inadvisable to run for a seat. Men employed at large companies or institutions were particularly poorly situated for a seat run. They may not have had sufficient vacation time to cover absences that the assembly meetings would require, and they were subject to frequent transfers. In fact, I knew two men who were very active in the anti-plant movement who were transferred to work in other cities during my time in Machi. They used what vacation they could take to return to their hometown and campaign for the female candidates who represented their groups.

Members of the referendum alliance included representatives of all sorts of professions—for example, plumbers, farmers, independent business owners, school teachers, bureaucrats (on the sly), engineers, and lawyers. But it is fair to say that, on the whole, in age—averaging in the low 40s for the Green Association to the high 40s for the Referendum Association and the mid 50s for the independent-socialists—and in work situation, the anti-plant group men differed from the typical male assembly seat holders. Indeed, all but three of the conser-

vative assembly members were older than 60. And those who were involved in assembly politics prior to reaching retirement age were either farmers or small business owners, capable of controlling their own work schedule to some degree. The Social Democrat was a retired postal worker. The Communist was an exception in that he supported himself on his assembly seat salary and by doing party work—as his father had before him.

When leaders of the anti-plant movement approached men they thought would be strong candidates to ask them to run, they were told, again and again, that work obligations would not permit the potential candidates to run. The husbands of Aoki-san and Sakata-san, who had both captured far more than enough votes in their bids for the mayoralty to win seats in the assembly, were clear cases of this. They were mid-career professionals who might have managed on a mayor's salary of 818,000 yen per month, but who would not ask their families to try to squeeze by on the fraction of that amount paid to assembly members. Kagawa-san's husband certainly had the political connections to build a campaign, but, he, too, could not countenance the salary cut he would have to undergo if he took an assembly seat. The more poorly paid male members of the Referendum Association might have found the assembly salary acceptable, but they were least able to take the risk of taking time off from their current jobs to campaign for an uncertain new one. Tellingly, all three of the men who did run for seats as representatives of the Referendum Association were independent workers in one way or another. One had a small nursery business that was very busy in only a couple of short seasons, one was a rare fulltime farmer, and the third was part owner of a contracting business he shared with his brother who was willing to work to make up the difference during assembly sessions.

In the April 1999 elections, the Referendum Association hoped to put up five or six candidates. With six candidates in office, and with the support of other alliance members, the pro-referendum/anti-plant groups could control the assembly majority. With five candidates in office, the pro- and anti-plant factions

in the assembly would be tied. That meant that if the conservatives put their own man up for the speaker's seat, the pro-referendum groups would usually have a majority. By the end of February 1999, the Referendum Association knew it would be able to run at least three candidates, Aoki-san, the female incumbent and fulltime housewife, Takahashi-san, the male incumbent and fulltime farmer, and Toda-san, a single mother who would be better off on the assembly salary than on the pay from her newspaper delivery job. Over the months leading up to the election, the Referendum Association members tried again and again to persuade men to become candidates. After being turned down by several likely prospects, they began to talk about searching for a young female candidate. At first male group leaders resisted the idea, worried what a run for office might do to the reputation of a young woman (a worry they did not express for male potential candidates). Eventually, the men reasoned that a young woman would be hard pressed to find better career options elsewhere and that the freshness of a young female face might make the campaign attractive to voters otherwise disaffected. Thus, they settled on Miura-san, the young daughter of a founding member of the Referendum Association.

In another, more insidious way, men's roles as breadwinners prohibited their fullest participation in the anti-plant movement. Men who worked in businesses that were owned by or served supporters of the plant project had much to lose if they expressed their opposition openly. As elsewhere in rural Japan, construction firms were powerful locally.[8] Their owners were conservative, and they expected to be the likely beneficiaries of public works projects that would come with the building of the plant or because of the subsidies the national government would pay the local government for accepting the plant.[9] A close male friend of Miura-san was an employee of an area construction firm and, therefore, could not do much to aid her campaign. A key female leader of the Green Association was married to a carpenter who did not dare show his face at any Green Association activities because he feared he would stop getting hired to work for

construction firms in the area. Several women I met at Referendum Association meetings came without their husbands because their husbands feared the economic consequences of being associated with the plant opposition movement. Leaders of the Referendum Association who operated restaurants or stores knew how real such threats could be because they had experienced business boycotts when supporters of the waste disposal plant found out about the Referendum Association's founding. One Association leader had his long-term Lions' Club membership revoked by the other members who were supporters of the plant project, and a local police detective actually stopped by his shop to ask him about his politics.

Of course, a curious question remains: why were wives in some cases able to brave a reputation as opposition activists without adversely affecting their husband's workplace interests? I think the answer might be found in what a conservative assembly member said to me about losing the referendum to the anti-plant activists. The loss, he said, was the result of "young mothers" being swayed emotionally by school teachers who claimed that the waste disposal plant would be dangerous to their children. The opposition activities of women were, in this man's estimation, the understandable result of their emotional involvement in motherhood. He did not blame the young mothers. In fact, he blamed the male school teachers and later, the "activists from outside" for preying upon vulnerable subjects. Because the conservative plant supporters did not think women were capable of making "reasonable" decisions in the face of pressure from men, the conservatives did not see women's political behavior as the object of sanction in the way they saw the behavior of male business associates and employees. Comments I heard from other conservatives that blamed men for upsetting mothers or failing to calm them support my reading of the constraint that expectations of masculine responsibility placed upon men's behavior.

The men in the referendum alliance were quite aware of the fact that their roles as breadwinners constrained their activities in politics. They extended un-

derstanding and sympathy to those men who were unable to back up conviction with action by standing for office when those men were perceived as having responsibilities such as a wife and young children to support. Interestingly, alliance men did not see the constraints with which they struggled as gender-based problems despite the fact that, arguably, that is exactly what they were. Because men in some positions could participate in politics, the generalized assumption was that politics was a hard place for women, but not for men. But looked at from another perspective, politics was in some ways even harder to enter for *most* men than it was for some women. Because the gendered division of labor consigned them to the role of family provider, men felt much more at the mercy of those who could affect their income than did their wives.

Moreover, men in the ranks of Machi's referendum-citizens group alliance judged each other as men in large part on how well each seemed to fill his breadwinner status. Men interested in participating more in the referendum alliance activities could not simply make the choice to reduce or change their employment commitments because such choices would tend to make them appear as less than men in the eyes of their fellow activists, who might, thus, be less inclined to share with them in political endeavors. This breadwinner reputational constraint was not merely a judgment of a man's earning prowess. For example, the movement leader with whom I lived had great respect for some men believed to have low incomes who turned down his urging to stand in the elections because they felt unable to take a financial risk. He praised them as men who worked *isshokenmei* (with their whole life's effort) to maintain their *seikatsu* (daily life).

Of course, a man's earning prowess was not entirely irrelevant to his reputation: hence, as I mentioned above, the group of men who provided the initial financing for the referendum group (1,150,000 yen each), were known as the seven samurai—men's men. Correspondingly, men who simply did not fit the role of breadwinner were not welcomed into the group. I listened as alliance

members derided one man who frequently came by to join morning chats about politics at the shop owned by one of the Referendum Association's leaders. The shop owner said the man was able to stop by and join conversations about the group's political objectives because he was a mere "thread" of a person. When I asked the shop owner what he meant, he told me that the man's family relied primarily on his wife's larger income which the man supplemented a bit by working nights at the local supermarket. The man had the perfect schedule to run for and serve in local office without damaging the family income prospects, but that schedule gave him an unmanly reputation that kept group leaders from considering him as a potential candidate.

Quite conscious of the breadwinner burden borne by their fellow movement members, leaders of the referendum alliance did not feel they could ask typical salarymen to run for office because the leaders could not guarantee the men a win. Ironically, this led them to turn to exactly the same sorts of retired and well-off men as potential candidates the conservatives approached, the ones whom alliance members slightingly described as "honorary" representatives or people "who just like to be in elections" (*sukide sukide shouganai* 好きで好きでしょうがない). But the men of these sorts the alliance approached were problematic. Either alliance members suspected the strength of the men's commitment to the alliance cause and disagreed strongly about the prospective candidate, or the prospective candidates turned down requests to run, sometimes pointing out that running under the alliance's banner would be a hard way to win an election.

Why Gendered Campaign Strategies Worked Better for Women Than for Men

The three men in the Referendum Association who did become candidates in 1995 and 1999 suffered handicaps related to their responsibilities as family breadwinners, and the fact that they were men prevented them from effec-

tively using some of the clever underdog strategies employed by female candidates. As men, they found that differentiating themselves from conservative male candidates was more difficult than it was for progressive female candidates, and thus, for the Association men, selling themselves as true fresh faces, with real reform agendas was more difficult. Part of this was the effect of the fact that, because women had been almost entirely excluded from past political practices that were widely accepted as thoroughly corrupt, female candidates' claims to represent a new politics was, quite literally, true on the face. Part of the problem for male candidates was that their natural support base, networks of friends and colleagues, had often already been mobilized by leaders in the conservative political establishment that had dominated Machi since the early postwar era. For men, mobilizing friends usually meant reversing the mobilization that had already occurred. For women, mobilizing friends often meant asking for active support by women who had never been directly asked to support a friend; it meant asking a woman to change a vote she cast as a favor to a husband or father or some other male who had been the direct beneficiary of the old, male-centered mobilization practices. I'll treat the first problem for men, the image problem and then return to the second problem, the mobilization problem, in more detail.

Given the nature of the policy role of local governments, it is not surprising that both male and female candidates in the anti-plant/pro-referendum groups presented relatively similar concerns in the fliers, postcards, and government-sponsored advertisements they circulated to potential voters. In 1999, all of the circulated materials from each of the anti-plant alliance candidates stated prominently that the candidate would work hard to make sure that the results of the 1996 referendum in which voters had displayed their opposition to the industrial waste plant would be reflected in town policy. Connected with this was usually a pledge to protect Machi's natural resources such as clean air and water. Beyond that, most anti-waste candidates claimed a desire to improve the social welfare services such as care for the aged and disabled and the children of working moth-

ers. Several candidates, male and female, promised to represent farmers' voices in the assembly.

The anti-plant/pro-referendum candidates' self presentations did differ markedly from the presentations made by most conservative, pro-plant candidates. For example, most conservatives produced no fliers and made only the barest effort to make use of their allotted advertising space in the government-sponsored "election newspaper." A couple of candidates actually used hand-lettered statements in that official publication. One of these was so poorly lettered—illegible, small, and crooked in the box—that I could have prepared a better looking one. (And my handwritten Japanese is ghastly.) A few relied on a slogan on a business card. One 1999 conservative male candidate had run in 1995 as a supporter of the referendum, then turned against the referendum cause after winning and, consequently, suffered a recall at the hands of referendum supporting voters. He circulated a full-color, professionally-produced flier, but its main feature was a photo of him in athletic gear kicking a soccer ball. Journalists I spoke with and referendum alliance members suspected this man got funding from conservatives at higher levels of government. Most of the conservatives emphasized economic "redevelopment" as their key issue. Only one of the conservatives admitted in a publication that he was still a supporter of the waste plant, despite the fact that, when asked by researchers and journalists, the pro-plant candidates were perfectly willing to admit that what they meant by "economic redevelopment" was accepting the waste plant.

Male and female, the candidates from the pro-referendum alliance could fairly argue that their campaign literature, in style and substance, differentiated them from the pro-plant conservatives. However, viewed in a larger context, the female candidates' literature may have seemed especially distinctive to voters. For example, while men and women mentioned social welfare and education on their fliers and in their other methods of presentation, the women were able to add words that capitalized on the special expertise as family care-givers that

voters were likely to assume traveled with their gender markers. One female candidate began her flier by addressing a question about street safety to "those of us in the middle of child rearing." The four other female candidates used pink prominently in their circulated materials; three used it as the background color for a flier or postcard, while one used a painting of a cherry tree in full bloom on the front of her postcard. The candidate with the cherry tree postcard was widely known as the operator of a child and elder care center. One of the candidates with a pink flier, a fulltime housewife, specifically mentioned household garbage problems in her discussion of environmental concerns, and as this and other research I have done has shown, women feel women are specially able to speak about garbage problems because, in Japan, managing household garbage is usually women's work (LeBlanc 1999b). Another fulltime housewife simply declared on her pink postcard that she would use her "clean" (*migakiageta*　磨き上げた) housewife's perspective (*shufu kankaku*　主婦感覚) to "refresh" (フレッシュ) politics.

Obviously, the male candidates could neither capitalize on housewives' previous exclusion from corrupt politics nor declare themselves to be "hands-on" garbage problem experts. In fact, declaring themselves garbage experts might have been dangerously effeminizing. Worse yet, the men occasionally had to settle questions about why they were involved in politics when it might make their breadwinning role harder to perform. The man who lost in 1995 was not seen as a potential candidate in 1999, despite the fact that the Referendum Association was desperate for candidates, and he had some free time. This was because he was divorced, and his ex-wife and daughter, people told me, were not well supported by him. His small nursery business specializing in an exotic, flowering plant that required sales work only during a very limited part of the year and maintenance work during partial days the rest of the year was not seen as a sound means of supporting his family. Ironically, with the assembly salary he would have gotten if elected, he could have better supported his wife and daugh-

ter. But just as his fellow male movement leaders had ugly words for men who were financially supported by better earning wives, they were dubious that he could make a successful second run for the assembly.

His replacement in 1999 actually tried having his picture for his official campaign poster taken in the work clothes he wore on contracting jobs to strengthen the impression he was gainfully employed. The group finally decided that the photo would look too odd next to photos of other male candidates in jackets and ties. (Ironically even the "look" of a stable breadwinner was predetermined for male candidates.) Takahashi-san, who had won a seat in 1995 and was roundly praised by his friends as a hard worker, admitted that he had suffered criticism for the impact his political activity was believed to have on his breadwinning efforts. When his watermelon crop became diseased after the 1995 election, neighbors implied that his neglect during the election season was the cause. Of course, because Takahashi-san was a fulltime farmer when most in the area did farming in addition to other employment, the likelihood is that, even given the extra time he devoted to campaigning, he spent more time than most of his neighbors in his fields. Thus, while female candidates could compliment their claims to provide a fresh, new voice in politics with simple references to their femininity, the men who wanted to challenge the town's pro-plant, conservative establishment had to contend with the psychological noise caused by the assumption that politics was an activity for dilettantes who had either completed or were not serious about earning their family's living.

Of course, I can not be absolutely certain that voters read these messages as I did, but I do have some clues that my analysis is not completely wrong. Because I was in Machi during the prefectural assembly elections as well as the town assembly elections, I was able to observe the ways in which my research subjects were approached about voting in an election in which the pro-plant/anti-plant divide was not operational. And in that election, relatives and neighbors active in the various prefectural assembly candidates' campaigns would stop by

to drop off candidates' fliers and talk about their qualities. In fact, I collected quite a complement of prefectural election fliers by sitting in on the visits to the family with which I was living, and I was able to listen in as the information on the fliers was translated into specifics about the candidate's work history or gender (For example comments such as this: "He just waited around until he could get his seat from his daddy; he's never done anything."). Female candidates were uniformly associated with freshness.

We might think that in a relatively small town like Machi (population 30,000), where these systems of connections were seen as integral to the campaign process, men would have an advantage because they would be members of more politically influential circles than would women. But in Machi, only some men—members of the long-term conservative political establishment plus the Socialist and the Communist—had such benefits. Men, such as the Referendum Association's male candidates, who wanted to challenge the conservatives from outside the Social Democratic or Communist camps (which had never held more than one assembly seat each, anyway) were disadvantaged in comparison with women. This was because, over the years, the conservative establishment had so penetrated most local, male-member organizations in their efforts for voter mobilization for elections to all levels of government, that male challengers seeking a new voter base had to work with men who already had histories of loyalty to other candidates or to higher-level elected officials supporting particular local candidates. Machi's elections were known by journalists for the prefectural paper as historically among the most corrupt in the prefecture. In fact, journalists, taxi cab drivers, even conservatives themselves, referred to them as "*nomase, kuwase senkyo*" (飲ませ食わせ選挙) or "make them eat, make them drink elections."

Even in the Referendum Association leadership, I knew of only one man who had never been included in the *nomase, kuwase* election events of elections prior to 1995. He had been an anti-plant activist since his college days and com-

muted to work in a larger city. But the small shop owners, the farmers, the employees of local businesses had all been out drinking with local political bosses at some point in their lives—as members of the chamber of commerce, the neighborhood youth association, or the area farmers' cooperative. Most had been out repeatedly over the years. Some had even delivered the food or drink served at the events. For some it had been a typical source of social life in their youth. Others had been mobilized in associations connected with their jobs to actually march in support of the plant, wearing headbands that proclaimed their supposed loyalty to the cause. Salarymen living in newer housing developments might not have been tapped by the old networks, but they also lacked the time and connections in the area to provide alternatives. So, for the Referendum Association's male candidates, campaigning among their same-sex networks meant doing a lot of explaining and doing it without the familiar perks of sake and sushi.

Women, on the other hand, had not traditionally been the direct targets of these mobilization efforts. The men in politics, including the Social Democrat and the Communist, admitted that they had never thought to try to reach women in a special way, assuming husbands, brothers, or fathers would carry home a ballot message. Certainly, my imperfect sample of women voters explained to me, women did pledge loyalties on the basis of these indirect relationships, but when their female friends asked them to reconsider their votes, they were more open to doing so. Not surprisingly, the female voters relied very heavily on same-sex networks in their mobilization efforts, turning to PTA friends, mothers who had used the same day care, old school mates, and neighborhood housewives. The surprising effectiveness of the female candidates' same-sex mobilization strategies in 1995 was rued by the conservatives and praised by the longtime male opposition for the same reason. As the Social Democrat pointed out, everyone had assumed that the women's votes were tied up by their male connections until women candidates went out to seek them.

What Did Not Happen in Machi Politics

As a result of the serendipitous rise of women to the forefront of the pro-referendum/anti-plant movement in Machi, gender expectations for women in politics were altered noticeably. What did *not* happen was a change in gender expectations for men. The fact that some male candidates lost to women proved women could win elections, but it was not viewed as proof that men could not because, after all, 16 of the 22 assembly seats were still held by men. Yet a more careful examination of those seat holders would tell a different story. Men younger than retirement age did not have seats with the exception of the Communist (always there in Japan to mess up our generalizations), two conservatives who owned their own businesses, and the conservative with the professional flier who was a farmer, as well as obviously well financed by some larger conservative interests. Middle class salarymen—those who would write their occupation *kaishain*（会社員）for "company employee"—were not represented in the assembly in any way, unless their wives count as their representatives. A portion of the local population had been effectively silenced, but it was not the female portion we gender scholars usually assume it is. Instead, the silenced were men who might easily be characterized as typical male voters, middle class, middle-aged, not aligned with either the left or right ends of the political spectrum—the core of the Japanese workforce. They went to work and stayed out of politics. Their acceptance of a gendered division of labor made sure that they did.

In Conclusion:

The effects of gender expectations on male participation in politics that I observed in Machi were not unlike those I observed following members of local assemblies in other areas of Japan. Tokyo is where I have done the bulk of my research, and there the growth of lifestyle politics in groups such as the Seikatsu-sha Nettowaku (Netto), which is dominated by female politicians, has attracted a great deal of attention. Ironically, the cooperative movement that led to the rise

of Netto politics was founded by progressive, non-party male activists who could not figure any other way of establishing a foothold in suburban Tokyo than reaching out to its female residents who, because they were responsible for the housework and children, were more likely to be at home in and active in their neighborhoods than their husbands who commuted to fulltime, salaried positions usually located outside the residential district（岩根 1993）.

Even in the male-dominant conservative politics, the powerful effects of breadwinner expectations are apparent. For example, I followed Takada-san, a man in his late 30s, as he campaigned for a ward assembly seat his father had held before him. Despite the advantages this man had as a successor to his father's position in a ward with a fairly large conservative vote, he struggled with the gender dimensions of identifying himself to his constituents. Because his only previous paid employment had been in his parents' real estate firm, some people, even some conservatives, described him to me as a "Botchan." One of his closest supporters explained to me that the young man could run for office because he was "very rich" and did not need a salary. This supporter explained that Takada-san's "wealthy" family had a traditional obligation to represent the local neighborhood, and in presentations to his supporters, Takada-san also seemed to echo such thinking by talking about himself as taking on a role of public service men in his family had practiced for generations.

After he had served in the ward assembly for several years I conducted a lengthy follow-up interview with Takada-san, asking him how he thought gender affected the way assembly members performed their jobs. He gave me a curious answer. He began our session by telling me a tale about a budget politics meeting members of the LDP in the Shirakawa ward assembly had held for their supporters.[10] Takada-san said the budget meeting was to him the best sort of example of how masculinity operated in politics. The ward budget was tight because money is tight all over Japan and Shirakawa ward, like many local governments, suffers from a terrible debt problem. As LDP supporters came in with their various bud-

get requests (things such as a request for continuing certain local subsidies for home renovations that would help to guarantee work for struggling local contractors and architects), Takada-san keenly felt the enormity of the demands compared with the constraints of ward resources. Many of the requests seemed disappointingly self serving. "We say, we'll look into it seriously," Takada-san said. "But we want them to understand the financial situation of the ward." He went on:

> As we're listening to these stories I think, well if you're really suffering that bad, couldn't you change to another line of work. When there are so many other kinds of business why do you have to come to this point [of demanding subsidies from us]?
>
> I think that, but they can't change professions or they are staying in this one—Well, in the case of men, well, there are assembly members who have built relationships in these business sectors, and then, I do understand a man's desire to stick with the line of work he started in. Up until now, in Japanese society it was always men working outside the home and women doing the housework—and if you think about it along those lines, you can see how male assembly members, how they say to these requests, "I understand what you're saying," and why they end up saying, "We'll do what we can to help you out."
>
> But, if the assembly people were, for example, female, probably, well to look at it from the point of view of a female assembly person, they'd say "Look our ward finances are in a bad position, so it's to be expected we can't continue all of these subsidies, right?" That's probably what they'd say.

Women, Takada-san said, would be able to "dryly" turn away men's budget requests because they would not have the political ties men did and because, even more importantly, they would not be vulnerable to the unspoken "gut" ties between men, the ties where in Takada-san's words, assembly members are "kind of slidingly watching the face of the request maker and, on top of that, not saying clearly 'we can't do that.'" As Takada-san says "Everybody is kind of saying to

each other 'understand my *hara no uchi* (my guts).'" Women aren't part of this men's world of the gut, Takada explains, and so female politicians are able to take policy stances that are both more rational and more ethical than those that the "art of the gut" (and the silent but mutual understanding of a breadwinner's obligations) foists off on conservative men like Takada-san.

My project allows us only one small window into the complexity of gender asymmetries as they operate in the Japanese political system. My fieldwork is confined to a few cases and limited by the qualities of my personal relationships with a small number of people. Nonetheless, I think we do have enough evidence here to warrant a more extended investigation of how gender and politics are intertwined. Until very recently political scientists tended to assume that gender scholarship could be reserved for those whose primary interest was increasing women's participation in the political sphere. But the case of the citizens' movement in Machi, as well as the work I have done in Tokyo and only briefly introduced here, suggest that, in fact, we can not even understand which men participate and why they participate in the way they do if we do not use a gender-conscious approach when analyzing their behavior. Another interesting benefit of the gender-conscious perspective as I have applied it to men here is that it makes it easier for us to see what might be most accurately described as class differences at work in the political arena. Importantly, these class differences in access to power are managed through the common participation of nearly *all* men, regardless of class, in playing out and thus reinforcing a gender role which makes some men politically more powerful. In short, I believe it is unlikely students of political processes in Japan – or perhaps any modern democracy – will really be able to study political power until gender has become a concern of all social scientists, not only those who hope to change the world for women.

Notes

(1) Portions of this research were funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, the Fulbright Research Grant program administered by the Japan-United States Educational Commission, and a Glenn Grant from Washington and Lee University.

(2) Sherry Ortner discusses the way in which our attention to the gender differences between men and women can obscure other sorts of structured social differences, such as those among men, which can be as important in shaping individual lives (Ortner 1996, especially 116–138). Others have pointed out that conflicts over the specific nature of hegemonic masculinity can pit men against each other in competitions where expectations about gender roles silence some men (Maier and Messerschmidt 1998).

(3) See for examples: Nagel 1998; Dean 1998; Courdileone 2000. These are all treatments of masculinity and politics in the U.S. I do not know of specific treatments of the relationship between masculinity and contemporary politics in Japan, but some work, such as a piece describing the masculinization of the Meiji emperor (Osa 1999) and another which explores the vision of masculinity embodied in changing public discourse about housing (Nishikawa 1999) do touch obliquely on the question of visions of manhood among political elites.)

(4) The name of the town and all of the informants and groups discussed have been changed for the sake of protecting confidentiality. I have also changed some facts about the town. This presents some concern because it could have the effect of placing the political conflict in a slightly different light for my readers. However, I want to be able to disclose the complicated realities of my informants' behavior and self representations without injuring their reputations, and I do no believe that the differences between my representation of the political situation in Machi and the actual circumstances of the situation would have a major effect on the gender politics involved. Regrettably, my emphasis on the privacy of my informants makes it difficult for other researchers working on the same town to draw explicit conclusions about the relationship between gender and the outcome of the conflict.

(5) It is also true that my first-person narrative style is quite common among ethnographers. An example of a more radical but nonetheless widely praised use of this "personal" approach is available in Ruth Behar's *Translated Woman* (1993). Other examples of this most personal (and expanding) approach to scholarly writing are available in the Freedman and Frey collection, *Autobiographical Writing Across the Disciplines* (2003).

(6) My term "referendum alliance" is my own term. Among anti-plant activists there were a variety of formal and informal group alliances with a range of names and overlapping memberships.

(7) In this paper, I can not take the space to document the intensity of my informants' desire to change local politics. However, anthropologists and sociologists have documented similar intensity in other towns that have held referenda (For examples see: 山室1998；新崎，ラミス

1999；渡辺 1997).

(8) According to Machi's town records, over 2,000 people were employed in construction in 1995. That made construction number three in field of employment after manufacturing and wholesale and retail sales, which employed a little over 3,000 each. The total labor force for the same year was estimated at 15,752. As some substantial portion of those in sales, services, and other sectors of employment were serving customers in the construction field, the portion of the work force directly affected by the preferences of leaders in construction is considerably higher than the number employed in that sector suggests.

(9) This phenomenon is described beautifully in Schlesinger 1999 and in the Niigata Nippo collection『原発を拒んだ町』1997.

(10) This ward name, as well as Takada-san's name, are pseudonyms designed to protect privacy.

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なぜ女性が男性を代表しているのか：

日本のある町議会におけるジェンダーと政治の小さな物語

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ジェンダーと政治に関する研究では，しばしば，性別役割に対する社会的期待が女性の政治参加を抑制するという点に焦点が当てられてきた。しかし，性別期待は男性の政治的行動も同様に抑制する。日本のある町議会選挙にみられた男性と女性の政治参加をケース・スタディとして，この論文は，男らしさに対する期待が，政治家として直接政治に参加できる男性のタイプを限定していることを分析しようと試みたものである。男性に課された一家の「大黒柱」としての義務が，市民運動の担い手である男性成員の立候補を困難にし，代わりに彼らの妻や娘が選挙に出馬することになったのである。男らしさをあらわす「大黒柱」という概念が，政治の場における男性の主張を限定したものにするという事実にもかかわらず，「大黒柱」役割を全うする男性たちによって，この概念が批判的に検討されることはめったにない。現行の政治に対して日々の生活に根ざした問題を解決し，生活の質の向上を求めていくことは，中流階層のサラリーマンには本質的に困難なことである。男性は女性よりも政治的権力を保有しているという捉え方は単純だが二面性を持っており，政治権力の現実性を追究する上では有効ではない。

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